

Ocean Borders K

Aff Answers

Rejection of State Bad

The alt's rejection of the states makes it seem stronger than it actually is. This dooms the alt to reproduce the hierarchal structures we critique.

Guattari and Rolnik, schitzoanalysts, revolutionaries, 1986

[Felix and Suely, Molecular Revolution in Brazil, p. 120-121]

Comment: It's good that you mentioned those homosexuals who worked within the system as lawyers and succeeded in shaking it up. Here, everyone looks down on the institutional part.¶ Guattari: That's silly.¶ Comment: **They think that dealing with the institutional side is reformism, that it doesn't change anything.** As far as they're concerned, the institutions should be ignored because only one kind of thing is worthwhile, anarchism—which I question deeply. **I think it's very naive,** as you yourself say, **to ignore the state on the basis that "it's useless," or "it oppresses us," and therefore to leave it aside and try to do something totally from outside, as though it might be possible for us to destroy it like that.**¶ Suely Rolnik:

This malaise in relation to institutions is nothing new; on the contrary, **the feeling is particularly strong in our generation which, since the 1960s, has taken institutions as one of its main targets.** But it's true that the malaise has been especially pronounced in Brazil over the last few years, and in my view this must have to do with an absolutely objective (and obvious) fact, which is the hardness of the dictatorship to which we were subjected for so long. The rigidity of that regime is embodied in all the country's institutions, in one way or another; in fact, that constituted an important factor for the permanence of the dictatorship in power over so many years.¶ **But I think that this antiinstitutional malaise, whatever its cause, doesn't end there: the feeling that the institutions are contaminated territories, and the conclusion that nothing should be invested in them, is often the expression of a defensive role. This kind of sensation is,** in my view, **the flip side of the fascination with the institution that characterizes the "bureaucratic libido."** These two attitudes really satisfy the same need, which is to use the prevailing forms, the instituted, as the sole, exclusive parameter in the organization of oneself and of relations with the other, and thus avoid succumbing to the danger of collapse that might be brought about by any kind of change. **Those are two styles of symbiosis with the institution: either "gluey" adhesion and identification** (those who adopt this style base their identity on the "instituted"), **or else repulsion and counteridentification** (those who adopt this style base their **identity on negation of the "instituted," as if there were something "outside" the institutions, a supposed "alternative" space to this world.**)¶

Seen in this light, both **"alternativism" and "bureaucratism" restrict themselves to approaching the world from the viewpoint of its forms and representations, from a molar viewpoint; they protect themselves against accessing the molecular plane, where new sensations are being produced and composed and ultimately force the creation of new forms of reality.** They both reflect a blockage of instituting power, an impossibility of surrender to the processes of singularization, a need for conservation of the prevailing forms, a difficulty in gaining access to the molecular plane, where the new is engendered. **It's more difficult, to perceive this in the case of "alternativism," because it involves the hallucination of a supposedly parallel world that emanates the illusion of unfettered autonomy and freedom of creation;** and just when we think we've got away from "squareness" we risk succumbing to it again, in a more disguised form. In this respect, I agree with you: the institutions aren't going to be changed by pretending that they don't exist. Nonetheless, it's necessary to add two reserves. In the first place, **it's obvious that not every social experimentation qualified by the name of "alternative" is marked by this defensive hallucination of a parallel world.** And secondly, x it's self-evident that in order to bear the harshness of an authoritarian regime there is a tendency to make believe that it doesn't exist, so as not to have to enter into contact with sensations of frustration and powerlessness that go beyond the limit of tolerability (indeed, this is a general reaction before any traumatic experience). And in order to survive, people try in so far as possible to create other territories of life, which are often clandestine.

Permutation

We must approach borders with pragmatism – they are inevitable and sometimes necessary

Agnew No Date (John Agnew – Department of Geography, University of California, Los Angeles, “Borders on the mind: re-framing border thinking”, Ethics & Global Politics, <http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/geog/downloads/856/258.pdf> // JJ)

Be that as it may, **it is implicit in this understanding that borders can serve a number of vital socio-political purposes. One is straightforwardly instrumental; borders help clearly demarcate institutional and public-goods based externality fields.** If spending on infrastructure projects (education, highways, etc.), for example, must necessarily be defined territorially, as Michael Mann has argued, and the revenues raised concomitantly, then borders are necessary to define who is eligible and who is not to share in the benefits of the projects in question. ²¹ Thus, **absent territorial restrictions on eligibility, cross-border movements of people would undermine the essentially contractual obligations that underpin both state infra-structural power and the autonomous role of the state that depends on it.** So, **liberal conceptions of borders can be less inchoate than frequently alleged, if understood solely in terms of defense of rights in property, but only if refocused on the provision of public goods rather than on the protection of private property.** ²² **Less liberal or instrumental in character are the ways in which borders help focus on the question of political identity.** This has four aspects to it. The first and most traditional is **the claim to sovereignty and its realization since the eighteenth century as a territorial ideal for a people endowed with self-rule.** Typically, all struggles to extend and deepen popular rule, associated usually with such terms as ‘democracy’, have been bound up with the sovereignty ideal. Who shall rule around here? has been the rallying cry across all political revolutions. Thus, recently, Jeremy Rabkin has defined sovereignty as the ‘authority to establish what law is binding ... in a given territory’. ²³ From this viewpoint, laws can only be enforced when the institutional basis to that law is widely accepted. It depends on popular acceptance and agreement to allow coercion in the absence of compliance. **Intuitively, the reach of institutions must**

begin and it must end somewhere. This is a fairly conservative understanding of political identity. Beyond it lie several other versions of how political identity is served by borders. One is that **identities themselves, our self-definitions, are inherently territorial.** Contrary to a liberal sense of the isolated self, from this perspective **all identities are based on kinship and extra-kinship ties that bind people together overwhelmingly through the social power of adjacency. From clan and tribe to nation, group membership has been the lever of cultural survival. Rather than merely incidental, borders are intrinsic to group formation and perpetuation.** Thus, a self-defined political progressive such as Tom Nairn can speak openly of a ‘social nature’ that requires ‘belonging’ and ‘can be chosen and self-conscious’, which can result in people coming to feel ‘more strongly* and less ambivalently* about their clan, football team or nation, than about parents, siblings and cousins who directly helped to form them’. ²⁴ Many nations today are still actively in pursuit of their very own state with its very own borders. ²⁵ Kurds rioting in Turkey and Tibetans protesting Chinese rule are only two of a myriad of recent examples. Elsewhere, there is a revival of spatially complex forms of citizenship, as in Spain and the United Kingdom, where people can simultaneously belong to several polities differentially embedded within existing states. ²⁶ Of course, this was once quite common all over Europe.

Some degree of borders are necessary – we should focus on the shifting nature of territorial borders rather than trying to abolish them altogether

Elden 11 (Stuart Elden – professor of political geography at Durham University, “Territory without Borders”, Harvard International Review (8/21/2011), <http://hir.harvard.edu/archives/2843> // JJ)

What does it mean to speak of ‘territory without borders’? Let me say immediately that this is not the same as the ‘borderless world’ argument, nor in agreement with the idea that geography no longer matters. While borders are less important in

some places, such as within much of Europe, in others they continue to be crucial.
The US-Mexico border, the external border policing of Europe, and the Israeli wall in the West Bank are only the most striking examples of the continual importance of borders. I am not suggesting that we should comprehend the modern world through a lens that understands globalization as de-territorialization. Indeed, it is the concomitant processes of re-territorialization—the constant making and remaking of territories—that should perhaps be more of the focus in our empirical and political studies.¶ Nor am I using the phrase as a way of describing modes of political organizations such as Schengenland, which seeks to dispense with border controls. Schengenland has indeed been described as a ‘territory without borders’; it would be more accurate to describe it as **an area with uneven borders**. While it is true that mobility in Schengenland is much easier for those individuals whose status is good and whose papers are in order, mobility is restricted and strictly monitored through transnational security and policing for those who fail to meet these characteristics.

Deconstruction cannot be confined to one method or the movement will fail

Vaughn-Williams 9 (Nick, IR MA @ university of Warwick IR PhD @ Aberystwyth, “Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign Power” pg 146-47)

Derrida is notoriously hesitant to define deconstruction because any attempt at such a definition would be ironic. In his ‘Letter to a Japanese Friend’, Derrida writes: **‘What deconstruction is not? Everything of course! What is deconstruction? Nothing of course!’**⁷⁰ More accessible accounts of the basic moves of deconstructive thought can be found in Positions [1981] and Limited Inc. [1988]. Derrida insists that (p.147) a **deconstructive strategy or way of reading always involves a double and simultaneous movement: Deconstruction cannot be restricted or immediately pass to a neutralization: it must, through a double gesture, double science, a double writing – put into practice a reversal of the classical opposition and a general displacement of the system. It is on that condition alone that deconstruction will provide the means of intervening in the field of oppositions it criticizes and that is also a field of non-discursive forces.**⁷¹

An outright rejection of borders fails. Reframing our concepts of borders in terms of effects is crucial to cultivate a politics attentive to lived experience

Agnew 8

(John, Department of Geography, UCLA, “Borders on the mind: re-framing border thinking” Ethics & Global Politics Vol. 1, No. 4, 2008)

¶ Fourthly, and finally, **policing borders still has a powerful normative justification in¶ the defense of that territorial sovereignty which serves to underpin both liberal and¶ democratic claims to** (Lockean) **popular rule**. Now such claims may frequently be¶ empirically fictive, particularly in the case of imperial and large nation-states, but the¶ logic of the argument is that, **absent effective worldwide government, the highest¶ authority available is that of existing states**.⁶⁸ How such states police their borders, of¶ course, should be subject to transparent and open regulation. But why it is popularly¶ legitimate to engage in policing functions in the way they are carried out cannot¶ simply be put down to mass docility in the face of an omnipotent (because it is¶ omniscient) state apparatus. **National populations do worry about their borders¶ because their democracy** (or other, familiar, politics) **depends on it. The border is a¶ continuing marker of a national** (or supranational) **political order even as people, in¶ Europe at least, can now cross it** for lunch.⁶⁹ The problem here is that **democratic¶ theory and practice is not yet up to dealing with the complexities of a world in which¶ territories and flows must necessarily co-exist**. If one can argue, as does Arash¶ Abizadeh, that ‘the demos of democratic theory is in principle unbounded’, this still¶ begs the question of who is ‘foreigner’ and who is ‘citizen’ in a world that is still¶ practically divided by borders.⁷⁰ As Sofia Nassstrom puts the problem succinctly: **it is¶ one thing to argue that globalization has opened the door to a problem within¶ modern political thought, quite another to**

argue that globalization is the origin of this problem.⁷¹ Until political community is redefined in some way as not being coextensive with nation-state, we will be stuck with much of business as usual. Currently then, **given the strong arguments about what borders do and the problems that they also entail, a more productive ethic than thinking either just with or just against them would be to re-frame the discussion in terms of the impacts that borders have; what they do both for and to people. From this perspective, we can both recognize the necessary roles of borders and the barriers to improved welfare that they create.** In the first place, however, this requires re-framing thinking about borders away from the emphasis on national citizenship towards a model of what Dora Kostakopoulou calls 'civic registration'.⁷² Under this model, the only condition for residence would be demonstrated willingness to live according to democratic rule plus some set requirements for residency and the absence of a serious criminal record. Such a citizenship model requires a reconceptualization of territorial space as a 'dwelling space' for residents and, thus, a move away from the nationalist narratives which cultivate 'the belief that territory is a form of property to be owned by a particular national group, either because the latter has established a "first occupancy" claim or because it regards this territory as a formative part of its identity'.⁷³ In a world in which wars and systematic violations of human rights push millions to seek asylum across borders every year, this rethinking is imperative.⁷⁴ In the second place, and by way of example, from this viewpoint it is reasonable 'to prefer global redistributive justice to open borders. To put it bluntly, **it is better to shift resources to people rather than permitting people to shift themselves towards resources**'.⁷⁵ Currently much migration from country-to-country is the result of the desire to improve economic well-being and enhance the life-chances of offspring. Yet, **people often prefer to stay put, for familial, social, and political reasons**, if they can. **There seems no good basis, therefore, to eulogize and institutionalize movement as inherently preferable to staying put.** If adequate mechanisms were developed to stimulate development in situ, many people who currently move would not. Not only people in destination countries associate their identities with territory. **Using the standard of a decent life, therefore, can lead beyond the present impasse between the two dominant views of borders towards a perspective that re-frames borders as having both negative and positive effects and that focuses on how people can both benefit from borders and avoid their most harmful effects.** In political vision as in everyday practice, therefore, borders remain as ambiguously relevant as ever, even as we work to enhance their positive and limit their negative effects.

Imagining multiple genealogies of place-based practices challenges the current epistemology of dominance and subalternity.

Escobar 2001

(Arturo, Department of Anthropology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, "Culture sits in places: reflections on globalism and subaltern strategies of localization" Political Geography 20) It might seem paradoxical to assert that the identities that can be seen as emerging in the cultural-environmental domain today might simultaneously be attached to place and most open to what remains unimagined and unthought in biological, cultural, and economic terms. These **identities engage in more complex types of mixing and dialectics than in the most recent past. The dynamic of place, networks, and power at play today in many ambits suggests that this is the case. Subaltern strategies of localization still need still to be seen in terms of place;** places are surely connected and constructed yet those constructions entail boundaries, grounds, selective connection, interaction, and positioning, and in some cases a renewal of history-making skills. **Connectivity, interactivity and positionality are the correlative characteristics of the attachment to place** (Escobar, 1999b,c), **and they derive greatly from the modes of operation of the networks** that are becoming central to the strategies of localization advanced by social movements (and, of course, by capital in different ways). Networks can be seen as apparatuses for the production of discourses and practices that connect nodes in a discontinuous space; **networks are not necessarily hierarchical but can in some cases be described as self-organizing, non-linear and non-hierarchical meshworks, as some theorists of complexity think of them at present** (De Landa, 1997). **They create flows that link sites which, operating more like fractal structures than fixed architectures, enable diverse couplings** (structural, strategic, conjunctural) **with other sites and networks. This is why I say that the meaning of the politics of place can be found at the intersection of the scaling effects of networks and the strategies of the emergent identities.** As Rocheleau put it eloquently, this calls for an interest in "the combination of people-in-place and people-in-networks, and the portability (or not) of people's ways of being-in-place and

being-in-relation with humans and other beings” (D. Rocheleau, personal communication). It has been said that the **ideas and practices of modernity are appropriated and reembedded in locally-situated practices, giving rise to a plethora of modernities through the assemblage of diverse cultural elements**, and that often times this process results in counter-tendencies and counter-development, defined as “the process by which multiple modernities are established” (Arce & Long, 2000: 19). **The challenge for this constructive proposal is to imagine multiple modernities from multiple directions, that is, from multiple genealogies of place-based** (if clearly not place-bound) **practices. It is at this level that “the postdevelopment moment” is of relevance**, at least in some recent reinterpretations of the concept. For Fagan (1999), for instance, **the construction of a post-development politics must start with a consideration of material struggles and the cultural politics around them, critically engage with dominant development discourse by acknowledging its problems, and imagine transformation strategies** fully cognizant of how cultural production is associated with power. “Reconstituted” development workers, researchers, and activists might thus begin to outline a more substantial post-development strategy. More than an anti-development movement, **this strategy point at the construction of post-development scenarios that incorporate a pedagogical orientation towards change**. A movement towards the defense of place might well be an element in this strategy. This defense is of course not the only source of hope and change, but an important dimension of them. The critique of the privilege of space over place, of capitalism over non-capitalism, of global cultures and natures over local ones is not so much, or not only, a critique of our understanding of the world but of the social theories on which we rely to derive such understanding. **This critique also points at the marginalization of intellectual production on globalization produced in the “peripheries” of the world** (Slater, 1998). **The critique, finally, is an attempt to bring social theory into line with the views of the world and political strategies of those who exist on the side of place, non-capitalism and local knowledge** — and effort to which anthropologists and ecologists are usually committed. **Dominance and subalternity**, as Guha (1988) forcefully demonstrated, **are complex social and epistemological phenomena. Those frameworks that elide the historical experience of the subaltern and that participate in the erasure of subaltern strategies of localization can also be said to participate in the prose of counterinsurgency**. Conversely, if it is true that politically enriched forms of difference are always under construction, there is hope that they could get to constitute new grounds for existence and significant rearticulations of subjectivity and alterity in their economic, cultural and ecological dimensions. In the last instance, anthropology, **political geography** and political ecology **can contribute to re-state the critique of current hegemonies as a question of the utopian imagination: Can the world be reconceived and reconstructed from the perspective of the multiplicity of place-based practices of culture, nature and economy? Which forms of “the global” can be imagined from multiple place-based perspectives?** Which counter-structures can be set into place to make them viable and productive? What notions of politics, democracy and the economy are needed to release the effectivity of the local in all of its multiplicity and contradictions? What role will various social actors — including technologies old and new — have to play in order to create the networks on which manifold forms of the local can rely in their encounter with the multiple manifestations of the global? Some of these **questions will have to be given serious consideration in our efforts to give shape to the imagination of alternatives to the current order of things**.

Totalizing rejections of globalization fail – the reappropriation space is necessary for any challenge to borders

Escobar 2001

(Arturo, Department of Anthropology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Culture sits in places: reflections on globalism and subaltern strategies of localization” Political Geography 20) Let us start with an enlightening critique of capitalocentrism in recent discourses of globalization. **This critique is intended to enable us to free up the space for thinking about the potential value of other local models of the economy in ways that also apply to models of nature or development**. Geographers Julie **Graham** and Katherine **Gibson** present a powerful case **against the claim**, shared by mainstream and left theories alike, **that capitalism is the hegemonic**, even the only present form of economy, and that it will continue to be so in the foreseeable future. **In this view, capitalism**

has been endowed with such dominance and hegemony in these theories, **that it has become impossible to think social reality differently**, let alone to imagine capitalism's suppression. **All other realities** (subsistence economies, "biodiversity economies", Third World forms of resistance, cooperatives and minor local initiatives, the recent barter and solidarity economies in various parts of the world, etc.) **are thus seen as opposite, subordinate, or complementary to capitalism, never as sources of a significant economic difference.** Their critique applies to most theories of globalization and even of postdevelopment, to the extent that the latter situate capitalism "at the center of development narratives, thus tending to devalue or marginalize possibilities of noncapitalist development" (Gibson-Graham, 1996: 41). **By criticizing capitalocentrism, these authors seek to liberate our ability for seeing noncapitalisms and building alternative economic imaginaries.** This reinterpretation challenges the inevitability of capitalist "penetration" that is assumed in much of the literature on globalization:

In the globalization script...only capitalism has the ability to spread and invade. Capitalism is presented as inherently spatial and as naturally stronger than the forms of noncapitalist economy (traditional economies, "Third World" economies, socialist economies, communal experiments) because of its presumed capacity to universalize the market for capitalist commodities...Globalization according to this script involves the violation and eventual death of "other" noncapitalist forms of economy...All forms of noncapitalism become damaged, violated, fallen, subordinated to capitalism...How can we challenge the similar representation of globalization as capable of "taking" the life from noncapitalist sites, particularly the "Third World"? (Gibson-Graham, 1996: 125, 130)

From this perspective, not everything that emerges from globalization can be said to conform to the capitalist script; in fact, globalization and development might propitiate a variety of economic development paths; these could be theorized in terms of postdevelopment in such a way that "the naturalness of capitalist identity as the template of all economic identity can be called into question" (Gibson-Graham, 1996: 146). They could also be conceived of, as Mayfair Yang does in her farsighted application of Gibson-Graham to the changing and multiple Chinese economies, in terms of the hybridity of economies; what she means by this is that many of today's economic formations in China are composed of both capitalist and a whole array of non-capitalist forms. With this reinterpretation, Yang challenges us to entertain the idea that **"indigenous economies do not always get ploughed under with the entrance of capitalism, but may even experience renewal and pose a challenge to the spread of capitalist principles and stimulate us to rethink and rework existing critiques of capitalism"** (Yang, 1999: 5). What is certain is that we no longer seem to be sure about what is there "on the ground" after centuries of capitalism and five decades of development. **Do we even know how to look at social reality in ways that might allow us to detect elements of difference that are not reducible to the constructs of capitalism and modernity?**

The role of ethnography has of course been particularly important in this respect. In the 1980s, a number of ethnographies documented active and creative resistance to capitalism and modernity in various settings¹⁰. Resistance by itself, however, is only suggestive of what is going on in many communities, stopping short of showing how people actively continue to create and reconstruct their lifeworlds and places. Successive works characterized the local hybridized models of the economy and the natural environment maintained by peasants and indigenous communities. The attention paid, particularly in Latin American anthropology and cultural studies, to cultural hybridization is another attempt at making visible the dynamic encounter of practices originating in many cultural and temporal matrices, and the extent to which local groups, far from being passive receivers of transnational conditions, actively shape the process of constructing identities, social relations, and economic practice (see Escobar, 1995 for a review of this literature). These lines of inquiry have reached sophisticated levels in the provision of nuanced accounts of the encounter between development, modernity, and local culture in postcolonial settings (see, for instance, Gupta, 1998; Arce & Long, 2000). These bodies of literature, however, are yet to be related systematically to the project of rethinking place from the perspective of practices of cultural, ecological, and economic difference among Third World communities in contexts of globalization and postcoloniality. This link might enable researchers to foreground the political aspects of their critique, not infrequently rendered intractable by the emphasis on the heterogeneity, hybridity, localization, and differentiation of forms and practices.

If the goal of Gibson-Graham was to provide an alternative language — a new class language in particular — for addressing the economic meaning of local practices, and if the goal of the postdevelopment literature is similarly to make visible practices of cultural and ecological difference which could serve as the basis for alternatives, it is necessary to acknowledge that these goals are inextricably linked to conceptions of locality, place, and place-based consciousness. Place is central to issues of development, culture and the environment and is equally essential, on the other, for **imagining other contexts for thinking about the construction of politics, knowledge and identity.** The erasure of place is a reflection of the asymmetry that exist between the global and the local in much contemporary literature on globalization, in which the global is associated with space, capital, history and agency while the local, conversely, is linked to place, labor, and tradition — as well as with women, minorities, the poor and, one might add, local cultures¹¹. Some feminist geographers have attempted to correct this asymmetry by arguing that place can also lead to articulations across space, for instance through networks of various kinds (Chernaik, 1996); this leaves unresolved, however, the relation between place and location, as well as the question of boundaries.

More fundamental perhaps in Dirlik's analysis are the consequences of the neglect

of place for current categories of social analysis such as class, gender, and race (and, we should add the environment here), which make such categories susceptible of becoming instruments of hegemony. To the extent that they are significantly sundered from place in discourses of globalization and deterritorialization, contemporary notions of culture do not manage to escape this predicament, for they tend to assume the existence of a global power structure in which the local occupies a necessarily subordinate position. Under these conditions, is it possible to launch a defense of place in which place and the local do not derive their meaning only from their juxtaposition to the global? **A first step in resisting the marginalization of place,** continuing with Dirlik's exposition, **is provided by Lefebvre's notion of place as a form of lived and grounded space and the reappropriation of which must be part of any radical political agenda against capitalism and spaceless and timeless globalization.** Politics, in other words, is also located in place, not only in the supra-levels of capital and space. Place, one might add, is the location of a multiplicity of forms of cultural politics, that is, of the cultural-becoming-political, as it has become evident with rainforest and other ecological social movements¹².

AT: Alt

Cedes the Political

ALT FAILS – even an active refusal cedes the political

Redfield 5 [Peter, Ph.D. Anthropology at UC Berkeley, professor of Anthropology at UNC Chapel Hill, “Doctors, Borders, and Life in Crisis,” Cultural Anthropology 20(3)] ***MSF = Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders)

Here the context of **MSF’s “ethic of refusal” comes** most sharply **into focus.**¶ The group’s **insistence on a politics of witnessing combined with its abstention¶ from taking a directly political role stems from an unwillingness to accept the extended state of emergency within which it generally operates.** Simply to denounce¶ situations would achieve no immediate humanitarian ends and to endorse political¶ agendas would potentially sacrifice the present needs of a population for the hope¶ of future conditions. But **to maintain formal neutrality at all times without protest¶ would mimic the classic limitations of the Red Cross movement that the founders¶ of MSF originally rejected.** Confronted with such a range of unsatisfying options¶ while still being committed to humanitarian values, **MSF’s ideological strategy¶ is to claim a position of “refusal” in the form of action taken with an outspoken,¶ troubled conscience.**

The practical application of this approach varies according to the situation.¶ **In truly exceptional circumstances MSF has found itself forced out or has chosen to withdraw.** For example, **during the** highly televised **Ethiopian famine of¶ 1984–85, the French section was forced to leave after accusing the regime of using both famine and relief aid to effect a forced resettlement policy. During the¶ dark Rwandan spring** a decade later, **MSF publicly proclaimed its helplessness¶ with a bitter, angry refrain: “you can’t stop genocide with doctors.”** The French¶ section both denounced the political complicity of its national government and¶ issued its first call for some form of military intervention to halt the slaughter.¶ Upset at the flagrant manipulation of aid by the perpetrators of genocide in the¶ aftermath, **MSF–France subsequently pulled out of the Rwandan refugee camps¶ in Zaire and Tanzania at the end of 1994 and then condemned the new Rwandan¶ regime** for the forcible repatriation and massacre of Hutu refugees. Although **other¶ MSF sections** followed different strategic lines of action amid heated debate, they¶ **all eventually withdrew from the camps by the end of 1995,** publicly protesting¶ the continuing political situation within them. **Most recently** and poignantly, **the organization withdrew from Afghanistan following the murder of five members of¶ a team from MSF–Holland in 2004.** After more than two decades of continuous¶ presence, the organization felt that **the altered political circumstances of U.S.-led¶ coalition efforts to administer a post-Taliban reconstruction had eliminated the¶ “humanitarian space” necessary for its operations.**

Race Turn

Critical geography cannot effectively combat race – whiteness is too inscribed in the study

Price 2010 [Patricia L. Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies, Florida International

University, *At the crossroads: critical race theory and critical geographies of race* in *Progress in Human Geography* 34(2) page 156]

Critical geographic studies of whiteness are not, however, without their own critics. Alastair Bonnett (1996), for instance, makes the (problematic) assertion that the tendency to focus on blackness or whiteness is a particularly 'American obsession' that does not reflect the subtler reality of race in other places. Yet there is very little intentionally comparative critical geographic research on race, such that Bonnett's claim is difficult to substantiate empirically. **What is perhaps more troubling – and**

easier to document – is the remarkably persistent whiteness of geography's practitioners. According to some, the popularity of white studies in geography may in fact simply reflect the whiteness of geographers, and as such constitute a zone of racial solipsism, or worse, a comfort zone rather than a space of truly critical engagement with racism (let alone anti-racism; Pulido, 2002; Mahtani, 2006). The prominence of white studies in geographic studies of race may in fact not simply reflect but also unwittingly act to reinforce white dominance in geography (Nash, 2003).

Cutting

Notes

New alt possibility → view the liquid nature of the ocean as it escapes human coding.